Optimal Capital Income Taxation by Andrew B. Abel
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








I thank Joao Gomes, Lars Ljungqvist, Robert Hall, Stavros Panageas, Tomas Piskorski, Leslie Reinhorn,
Thomas Sargent, Skander van den Heuvel, Jianfeng Yu, and the Penn Macro Lunch Group for helpful
comments and discussion. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Andrew B. Abel. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Optimal Capital Income Taxation
Andrew B. Abel




In an economy with identical infinitely-lived households that obtain utility from leisure as well as
consumption, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that the optimal tax system to pay for
an exogenous stream of government purchases involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long run, with
tax revenue collected by a distortionary tax on labor income.  Extending the results of Hall and Jorgenson
(1971) to general equilibrium, I show that if purchasers of capital are permitted to deduct capital expenditures
from taxable capital income, then a constant tax rate on capital income is non-distortionary.  Importantly,
even though this specification of the capital income tax imposes a zero effective tax rate on capital,
the capital income tax can collect substantial revenue.  Provided that government purchases do not
exceed gross capital income less gross investment, the optimal tax system will consist of a positive
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abel@wharton.upenn.eduThe optimal way for a government to collect revenue to pay for its purchases of
goods and services is to levy lump-sum taxes. However, lump-sum taxes generally
are not available, so some form of economic activity, such as labor income, capital
income, cigarette purchases, etc., must be taxed. Because the taxation of economic
activities is distortionary, a basic problem of public ﬁnance is how to use such taxes to
collect revenue in the least distortionary way. A classic problem of this sort analyzes
the optimal use of taxes on labor income and capital income to ﬁnance an exoge-
nous stream of government purchases in a Ramsey framework with a representative
inﬁnitely-lived household. The celebrated result of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985)
is that in the long run, the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero.
The Chamley-Judd result might be particularly puzzling to readers of an older
literature on the conditions for the neutrality of capital income taxation. The older
literature focused on the capital investment decision of a single ﬁrm, and did not
embed the ﬁrm in a general equilibrium model. Hall and Jorgenson (1971) showed
that for a ﬁrm that cannot deduct its cost of ﬁnancing (for example, under U.S. tax
law, a ﬁrm ﬁnanced entirely by equity), a tax on capital income that provides for
immediate expensing of capital expenditures will be neutral with respect to capital;
that is, it will have no eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s optimal capital accumulation. Tax codes
generally allow purchasers of capital to reduce their calculated taxable income by some
amount to reﬂect the cost of acquiring capital. This reduction in taxable income is
usually implemented through a schedule of depreciation allowances, which may or may
not be accelerated relative to the economic depreciation of the capital asset. The
most accelerated version of depreciation allowances is immediate expensing, which
leads to tax rate neutrality, as described above. A second neutrality result applies to
the case in which a ﬁrm can deduct its cost of ﬁnancing, as would be the case, under
U.S. tax law, for a ﬁrm ﬁnanced entirely by debt. In this case, Hall and Jorgenson
1show, and an earlier result of Samuelson (1964) implies, that allowing ﬁrms to deduct
true economic depreciation will lead to tax rate neutrality with respect to capital
investment.
The existence of neutral forms of capital income taxation, i.e., forms of capital
income taxation that do not aﬀect the capital investment decision of a ﬁrm, suggests
that these forms of capital taxation may provide the elusive lump-sum tax that can
allow the government to ﬁnance its expenditures without distortions. To explore
whether such capital income tax schemes can provide non-distortionary sources of
revenue, two major questions need to be addressed. First, does the neutrality of a
capital income tax scheme in the context of a single ﬁrm’s decision carry over to a
general equilibrium framework? Second, can a capital income tax that is neutral in
general equilibrium collect a nontrivial amount of revenue? The answer to the ﬁrst
question is diﬀerent for the two neutral tax schemes mentioned above. Speciﬁcally,
for a ﬁrm that cannot deduct the cost of ﬁnancing, a capital income tax system that
speciﬁes a constant tax rate and includes immediate expensing is neutral in general
equilibrium as well as in the context of a single ﬁrm. However, the neutrality of allow-
ing ﬁrms that can deduct ﬁnancing costs also to deduct economic depreciation does
not carry over to general equilibrium. Therefore, the body of this paper focuses on
the case with immediate expensing; the Appendix examines the case with economic
depreciation. I will show that for immediate expensing the answer to the second
question is also positive: a capital income tax with immediate expensing can collect
a substantial amount of revenue. Because a constant capital income tax rate with
immediate expensing does not aﬀect the accumulation of capital optimally chosen by
purchasers of capital, and can collect substantial revenue, it can be used to ﬁnance
government spending in a non-distortionary manner. Provided that the amount
of government spending does not exceed gross capital income less gross investment,
2there is no need to use distortionary labor income taxation.
The ﬁnding that a capital income tax with immediate expensing can collect a
nontrivial amount of revenue in a non-distortionary manner turns the Chamley-Judd
result on its head. Instead of setting the capital income tax rate equal to zero
and using a distortionary labor income tax to collect revenue as in Chamley-Judd,
the results in this paper indicate that the optimal conﬁguration of taxes is to set
the labor income tax rate equal to zero and to use a constant tax rate on capital
income, combined with immediate expensing, to collect revenue. The optimal capital
income tax scheme I present here leads to a higher level of utility of the representative
household than does the Chamley-Judd prescription because the tax system presented
here is non-distortionary, while Chamley-Judd requires the use of distortionary taxes.
The optimal tax scheme I present here holds in every period, not just in the long
run. The zero capital income tax rate prescribed by Chamley and Judd holds only in
the long run. Chamley also derives the optimal tax rate on capital income at every
point in time for the special case in which utility is separable over time, additively
separable in consumption and leisure, isoelastic in consumption, and linear in leisure.
In this special case, he shows that the optimal tax rate on capital income is initially
100% and remains equal to 100% until some point in time at which it abruptly jumps
to zero, and remains zero forever. However, I show that in a tax system that includes
immediate expensing, the optimal tax rate is constant over time.
Because the optimal tax policy in this paper stands in sharp contrast to the
c e l e b r a t e dz e r ot a xr a t eo nc a p i t a li n c o m ed e r i v e db yC h a m l e ya n dJ u d df o rt h e
long run, it is important to explain the source of the diﬀerence in the results. The
diﬀerence is due entirely to the treatment of capital expenditures in calculating capital
income. In actual tax codes, depreciation allowances permit ﬁrms to amortize the
cost of purchasing capital over time, and the present value of depreciation allowances
3– Hall and Jorgenson’s (1967) famous “z”– is generally between zero and one.1
Chamley has (implicitly) chosen to set z equal to zero. Judd speciﬁes depreciation
allowances equal to economic depreciation, so the implied value of z in his model is
between zero and one. As mentioned earlier, in the context of a single ﬁrm that can
deduct the cost of ﬁnancing, economic depreciation will make the capital income tax
neutral with respect to capital. However, as I demonstrate in the Appendix, this
result does not carry over to general equilibrium, so the capital income tax analyzed
by Judd is distortionary in a general equilibrium framework.
To illustrate the importance of the value of z, it is simplest to consider the class
of capital income tax policies characterized by a constant capital income tax rate,
τK, and a constant present value of depreciation deductions, z. The search for an
optimal capital income tax policy within this class of policies can be described as a
search for the optimal values of τK and z. C h a m l e ya n dJ u d de a c hc h o s ev a l u e so fz
without considering the optimal value of z. However, in this context, the eﬀective tax
rate on capital is (see Section 7) 1−z
1−zτKτK,s oi f0 ≤ z<1,a n dτK > 0,t h ee ﬀective
tax rate on capital is positive; that is, the capital income tax is distortionary. To
achieve a zero eﬀective tax rate with z<1—and thus avoid distortions—Chamley and
Judd each set τK =0 , which destroys the ability to collect tax revenue from capital
income. In this paper, I introduce immediate expensing, which implies z =1 ,s ot h a t
the eﬀective tax rate on capital is zero, even with a positive capital income tax rate,
τK. As I discuss in Section 6.1, this tax scheme is equivalent to a one-time seizure of
capital. Surprisingly, however, even if the initial capital stock available for seizure is
very small, the non-distortionary capital income tax with immediate expensing can
collect a sizable amount of revenue along balanced growth paths.2
1A more formal deﬁnition of z and a brief discussion are presented in Section 7.
2Lucas (1990), in discussing the results of Chamley and Judd, points out that a proportional tax
on gross capital income combined with an appropriate investment tax credit is non-distortionary,
but he does not address the question of how much revenue such a scheme can collect.
4The allocation that would prevail under lump-sum taxation can also be attained in
a competitive economy with a constant tax rate on the consumption good combined
with a subsidy to labor at the same rate. The constant tax rate on the consumption
good does not distort the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. To avoid an
intratemporal distortion between the consumption good and contemporaneous leisure,
leisure must be taxed at the same rate as the consumption good. That is, labor
supply must be subsidized. Although a tax on the consumption good accompanied
by a subsidy to labor can achieve the same allocation as a capital income tax with
immediate expensing, I will focus mostly on the capital income tax because my results
concerning the optimal capital income tax diﬀer so sharply from the well-known
Chamley-Judd result.
I develop a general equilibrium model with a capital income tax and immediate
expensing in the ﬁrst three sections of the paper. Section 1 provides a brief descrip-
tion of ﬁrms, which carry out production in the economy. Section 2 describes the
government’s purchases and its means of ﬁnancing these purchases with taxes and
debt. The household’s decision problem is described in Section 3, which also derives
a characterization of the equilibrium allocation of goods and leisure, and the evolu-
tion of rates of return. Section 4 describes the competitive equilibrium when the
capital income tax is replaced by lump-sum taxes. This equilibrium represents the
ﬁrst-best allocation, given the exogenous path of government purchases. It serves as
a benchmark to show that a capital income tax with immediate expensing will achieve
the ﬁrst-best equilibrium, which I do in Section 5. Then in Section 6, I calculate the
amount of tax revenue that can be collected with a capital income tax that includes
immediate expensing. I derive a simple expression for capital income tax revenue
in a steady state, as well an expression that holds along balanced growth paths. In
Section 7, I derive the eﬀective tax rate on capital. I show that the Chamley-Judd
5prescription for optimal tax policy in the long run and my prescription are both
characterized by a zero eﬀective tax rate on capital. However, a zero eﬀective tax
rate on capital does not mean that capital income tax revenue is zero. Indeed, my
formulation of the capital income tax can collect a potentially substantial amount of
revenue, though the capital income tax collects zero revenue in the long run in the
Chamley-Judd formulation. In Section 8, I demonstrate that a constant tax rate on
the consumption good combined with a subsidy to labor at the same rate can achieve
the same allocation as can be achieved by a constant capital income tax rate with
immediate expensing. I also derive the tax rate on the consumption good that will, in
ac l o s e de c o n o m y ,c o l l e c tt h es a m ea m o u n to ft a xr e v e n u ea sag i v e nc a p i t a li n c o m e
tax rate, and show that the tax rate on the consumption good is higher than the
equivalent tax rate on capital income. Concluding remarks are presented in Section
9.
1F i r m s
Consider a closed economy in which production is carried out by competitive ﬁrms
that rent the services of capital and labor in competitive markets. Labor is supplied
by a continuum of identical inﬁnitely-lived households. I normalize the measure of
households to be one. Each household works Ht hours in period t. The production
function is
Yt = F (Kt,L t), (1)
where Yt is output, Kt is the capital stock, and Lt ≡ AtHt is the amount of eﬀective
hours of labor input, where At is an index of labor-augmenting technical progress that
evolves deterministically over time. The production function F (Kt,L t) is linearly
homogeneous in Kt and Lt,w i t hFK > 0, FKK < 0, FL > 0,a n dFLL < 0.
6The equilibrium wage rate per eﬀective hour of labor is
wt = FL (Kt,L t). (2)
Since an hour of labor by a household generates At eﬀective hours of labor, the wage
per hour of labor is wtAt.
The gross rental earned by a unit of capital in period t is
rt = FK (Kt,L t). (3)
The capital stock depreciates at a constant proportional rate δ, so the evolution of
c a p i t a lo v e rt i m ei sg i v e nb y
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + It, (4)
where It is gross investment in period t.
2G o v e r n m e n t
The government purchases and consumes Gt units of output in period t.T h e v a l u e
of Gt evolves exogenously and deterministically over time. The government ﬁnances
its purchases of output by levying taxes on labor income and capital income and by
issuing bonds. Speciﬁcally, the government levies a tax at rate τL
t on labor income
in period t and a tax at rate τK
t on capital income in period t.M o s t a c t u a l t a x
systems compute taxable capital income by deducting some allowance for the cost of
purchasing capital. Here I adopt a particularly simple form of depreciation allowance.
I allow purchasers of capital to immediately expense capital expenditures. Therefore,
taxable capital income in period t is KtFK (Kt,L t)−It. Capital income tax revenue
7in period t equals taxable capital income multiplied by the capital income tax rate,
τK







t [KtFK (Kt,L t) − It]. (5)
If investment, It, exceeds gross capital income, KtFK (Kt,L t)−It,t h e nt a x a b l ec a p i t a l
income is negative, and the owners of capital receive a payment from the government.
Alternatively, but equivalently, if taxable capital income is negative, the owners of
capital could receive a tax credit that accrues interest and can be used to pay future
capital income tax liabilities. In the long run, however, the dynamic eﬃciency of
the aggregate economy implies that gross capital income exceeds investment, so that
taxable capital income is positive.
Let Tt be total tax revenue from the labor income tax and the capital income tax
in period t. Using equation (4) to substitute Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt for gross investment
in equation (5) yields
Tt = τ
L
t wtAtHt + τ
K
t [KtFK (Kt,A tHt)+( 1− δ)Kt − Kt+1]. (6)
Let Bt be the value of one-period government bonds issued at the end of period
t−1.I n p e r i o d t, these bonds pay a gross interest rate Rt so that the gross payment
to bondholders, including interest and repayment of principal, is RtBt.T h e r e f o r e ,
the government’s budget constraint can be written as
Gt + RtBt = Tt + Bt+1, (7)
where the left hand side of equation (7) is the government’s expenditure on goods
plus the interest and repayment of principal on outstanding bonds, and the right
hand side of equation (7) is the sum of tax revenue and the funds raised by selling
8new bonds in period t. Substituting equation (6) into equation (7) yields
Gt + RtBt = τ
L
t wtAtHt + τ
K
t [KtFK (Kt,A tHt)+( 1− δ)Kt − Kt+1]+Bt+1. (8)
3 Households
The representative household supplies labor, consumes goods and leisure, holds gov-
ernment bonds and the economy’s capital stock, and pays taxes. The household rents
the capital stock to ﬁrms during period t at a rental price of rt per unit of capital, and
pays taxes on capital income, net of the immediate expensing of capital expenditures.





where Ct is the household’s consumption of goods in period t and lt is the household’s
leisure in period t. I assume that the household is endowed with one hour of time
per period, so lt =1− Ht. I also assume that β<1, uc > 0, ucc < 0, ul > 0,
and ull < 0. The utility function in equation (9) does not depend on the level
of government purchases. Strictly speaking, this exclusion of Gt from the utility
function (and from the production function) means that government purchases are
purely wasteful. More generally, the inclusion of Gt in the utility function would
have no eﬀect on household decisions, provided that the utility function is additively
separable in Gt and (Ct,l t).
The budget constraint of the household is















t [Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt]+RtBt.
9The left hand side of the budget constraint in equation (10) contains the house-
hold’s expenditure on consumption in period t, Ct, the expenditure on new capital
goods in period t, It = Kt+1−(1 − δ)Kt, and the purchase of new one-period govern-
ment bonds in period t, Bt+1. The four terms on the right hand side of the budget





wtAtHt, the household’s after-tax capital income (before taking account of





rtKt, the value of the reduction in period t
taxes resulting from the expensing of capital expenditures, τK
t [Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt],
and the interest and principal received from maturing one-period bonds in period t.
The household chooses the sequences of consumption, Ct,h o u r so fw o r k ,Ht,
capital, Kt+1, and bonds, Bt+1, to maximize utility in equation (9) subject to the





















t [Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt]





The ﬁrst-order conditions are
(Ct): uC (Ct,1 − Ht)=λt (12)















Bt+j =0 , which rules out the possibility that the consumer borrows and













βλt+1 (rt+1 +1− δ) (14)
(Bt+1): λt = βRt+1λt+1. (15)
The next step is to eliminate the lagrange multiplier λt from the system of four
equations (12) - (15) and to use the expressions for wt and rt in equations (2) and (3)
to obtain the following three equations










uC (Ct+1,1 − Ht+1)













uC (Ct+1,1 − Ht+1)
uC (Ct,1 − Ht)
¸
Rt+1 =1 . (18)
Equation (16) equates the loss in utility from working an additional hour, and
thus reducing leisure by an hour, in period t to the increase in utility that can be





AtFL (Kt,A tHt), and using this income to increase consumption in period
t. Equations (17) and (18) are both illustrations of the standard intertemporal
optimization condition that requires the product of the intertemporal marginal rate
o fs u b s t i t u t i o na n dt h eg r o s sr a t eo fr e t u r no na na s s e tt ob ee q u a lt oo n e . I nb o t h
equations, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is given by the term in the
ﬁrst set of square brackets on the left hand side. In the case of capital, the gross
rate of return is the term in the second set of square brackets on the left hand side of
11equation (17). In the presence of immediate expensing of capital expenditures, the
eﬀective price of capital in period t is 1 − τK
t . The after-tax payoﬀ in period t +1





FK (Kt+1,A t+1Ht+1), plus the value of the remaining fraction 1 − δ of the
unit of capital, which has an after-tax price of 1−τK
t+1 in period t+1. Thus, the gross
rate of return on capital is the ratio of the after-tax payoﬀ in period t +1accruing
to a unit of capital purchased in period t to the eﬀective purchase price of capital in
period t. In the case of bonds, the gross rate of return is simply Rt+1,s oe q u a t i o n
(18) shows that the product of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and
the gross rate of return on bonds equals one.
4 Allocation with Lump-sum Taxes
If the government can levy lump-sum taxes, then it can achieve the optimal allocation
by setting the tax rates on labor income and capital income equal to zero. With
τK
t = τL
t =0 , the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions in equations (16) - (18) become




uC (Ct+1,1 − Ht+1)
uC (Ct,1 − Ht)
¸




uC (Ct+1,1 − Ht+1)
uC (Ct,1 − Ht)
¸
Rt+1 =1 . (21)
Equations (19) - (21) characterize the optimal allocation of Ct, Ht, Kt+1,a n dBt+1
that would prevail under lump-sum taxes.
125 Taxes that Satisfy Optimality Conditions
Now return to the case in which there are no lump-sum taxes. The government
has available only taxes on labor income and on capital income, as described earlier.
Let τL
t =0for all t, and let the capital income tax rate τK
t be constant for all
t. Observe that with a zero tax on labor income and a constant tax rate on capital
income, with immediate expensing of capital expenditures, the household’s ﬁrst-order
conditions in equations (16) - (18) are identical to the ﬁrst-order conditions describing
the optimal allocation in equations (19) - (21). This equivalence reﬂects the fact that
with full expensing, the capital income tax is neutral, i.e., that it does not distort
the optimal choice of the capital stock. Notice that the replication of the optimal
allocation with a constant capital income tax rate is not just a steady-state result. It
holds for arbitrary (deterministic) paths of labor-augmenting technical progress, At,
and arbitrary (deterministic) paths of government purchases, Gt, provided that the
capital income tax can raise suﬃcient revenue to pay for government purchases.
Lucas (1990, p. 300) pointed out that “a tax on capital income combined with
an investment tax credit can imitate a capital levy perfectly” and thus is non-
distortionary. Though he did not state the magnitude of the appropriate invest-
ment tax credit, inspection of equation (5) reveals that the investment tax credit
rate must equal the capital income tax rate, τK
t , for the capital income tax to be
non-distortionary. That is, if gross capital income is taxed at rate τK
t ,a n di ft h e r ei s
an investment tax credit at rate νt in period t, capital income tax revenue in period
t is TK
t = τK
t KtFK (Kt,L t) − νtIt. If the investment tax credit rate, νt, is set equal
to the capital income tax rate, τK
t , this expression for capital income tax revenue is
identical to equation (5), and the capital income tax is non-distortionary.
Now that we have shown that a constant capital income tax rate combined with
immediate expensing (or the equivalent investment tax credit) is non-distortionary,
13we turn to the second major, and less well explored, question in this paper: Can a
non-distortionary tax on capital income collect enough revenue to pay for government
purchases, without having to resort to additional (distortionary) taxes?
6H o w M u c h R e v e n u e C a n b e C o l l e c t e d b y a N o n -
distortionary Tax on Capital Income?
In this section, I will analyze the amount of revenue that can be collected by a constant
tax rate on capital income with immediate expensing of capital expenditures. I begin
by calculating capital income tax revenue in an arbitrary period t. Next, to illustrate
the size of capital income tax revenue, I will focus on balanced growth paths. First,
I will analyze the special case with constant At and Gt, so that there is a steady
state. Then I will analyze balanced growth paths with non-negative growth rates.
The reason for analyzing the two cases separately is that the utility function must
satisfy some additional restrictions in order for a balanced growth path with positive
growth to exist. The steady state does not require additional restrictions on the
utility function.
6.1 Capital Income Tax Revenue in an Arbitrary Period
To calculate taxable capital income in the presence of a constant tax rate, set the




FK (Kt,A tHt)=Rt − 1+δ. (22)
14Deﬁne γt+1 ≡
Kt+1
Kt to be the gross growth rate of the capital stock from period t to






Deﬁne Xt to be taxable capital income, with immediate expensing, in period t,s o
Xt ≡ KtFK (Kt,A tHt) − It. (24)






To express taxable capital income as a share of output, Yt, multiply both sides of
equation (22) by Kt
Yt ,d e ﬁne ηt ≡
KtFK(Kt,AtHt)
Yt as the capital share in income in period










Equation (27) shows the value of taxable capital income in an arbitrary period t.
Let Pt b et h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft a x a b l ec a p i t a li n c o m ef r o mp e r i o dt onward, discounted
back to period t,











15It can be shown that4,5
Pt = RtKt. (29)
Equation (29) implies that if capital income is taxed at rate τK from period t
onward, the present value of capital income tax revenue is τKRtKt.T h u s , i n t e r m s
of its eﬀects on tax revenue, this policy is equivalent to a one-time government seizure
of a fraction τKRt of the capital stock in period t. In other contexts, governments
that can seize capital once may face a temptation to seize capital again. This is the
nature of the classic time-consistency problem. However, with the capital income tax
analyzed here, there is no time-consistency problem, provided that the capital income
tax—or the equivalent one-time capital levy—can collect suﬃcient revenue to fund gov-
ernment purchases. The capital income tax in this economy is non-distortionary and
the economy achieves the ﬁrst-best allocation, so there is no incentive for the govern-
ment to try to set a lower tax rate initially to entice additional capital accumulation
only to seize it later.
For an economy that is in a very early stage of development with a very low level
of the capital stock, Kt, equation (29) might appear to imply that the opportunity
to ﬁnance government purchases with the capital income tax described here is very
limited. However, it is important to recognize that a very low value of Kt implies
4I thank Robert Hall for suggesting a similar version of this result in private correspondence.
5This result is based on the assumption that there exists a t∗ > 0 and ε>0 such that for all
t>t ∗,
γt+1
Rt < 1 − ε. This assumption is satisﬁed along the balanced growth paths in Section 6.3,
which assumes that βγ1−α < 1.
To prove the result in equation (29), substitute equation (25) into equation (28), and divide













Kt .U s e




Kt and rearrange the product of R
−1

















.D e ﬁne xt+j ≡
γt+j+1








(1 − xt+j). The lemma below implies Pt
RtKt =1 .
Lemma. Consider xi > 0 for i =0 ,1,2,...and for suﬃciently large N, xi < x<1,f o ri ≥ N.
Deﬁne Γj ≡
Qj−1
i=0 xi for j =1 ,2,3... Then S ≡ 1−x0+
P∞
j=1 (1 − xj)Γj =1 .P r o o f : Γ1 = x0 and
Γj+1 = xjΓj.f o rj ≥ 1. Therefore ST ≡ 1−x0+
PT





1 − ΓT+1.F o r j>N , 0 < Γj < xj−NΓN,s olimT→∞ ΓT+1 =0 . Therefore, S = limT→∞ ST =1 .
16that Rt = FK (Kt,A tHt)+1− δ is very high. The high value of Rt implies that Pt
can be substantially larger than Kt. In addition, the high value of Rt means that
future taxable capital income is discounted at a very high rate, which would make
the value of Pt appear small relative to the future ﬂows of taxable capital income. A
more appropriate way to gauge the size of taxable capital income and the possibility
of ﬁnancing government purchases with a capital income tax is to compare ﬂows over
long periods of time, such as in a steady state or along a balanced growth path. I
now turn to these cases.
6.2 Steady State
Suppose that the index of labor-augmenting technical progress, At,a n dg o v e r n m e n t
purchases, Gt, are both constant and that the economy is in a steady state with
constant capital, K, investment, I = δK, consumption, C,h o u r s ,H,a n dt a xr a t e
τK. Because the capital stock is constant, γt+j ≡
Kt+j
Kt+j−1 =1 ,f o rj =0 ,1,2,....I n
this case, equation (18) implies
Rt = β
−1 ≡ 1+ρ, (30)
where ρ>0 is deﬁned to be the rate of time preference. Substituting equation (30)
into equation (25) and setting γt+1 =1yields steady-state taxable capital income
(where I have omitted the time subscripts because these variables are constant in a
steady state)
X = ρK. (31)
Multiplying steady-state taxable capital income in equation (31) by the tax rate on




17Taxable capital income in the steady state is the product of the rate of time
preference, ρ, and the capital stock, K. Because the constant tax rate τK is not
distortionary, tax revenue is proportional to τK for 0 ≤ τK < 1. That is, there is
no Laﬀer curve for τK. By setting τK arbitrarily close to one, the government can
collect capital income tax revenue that is arbitrarily close to taxable capital income,
which is ρK in the steady state.
The steady-state capital-output ratio is obtained by substituting equation (30)





To relate steady-state tax revenue to steady-state output, substitute equation (33)






The share of taxable capital income in total income, Xt
Yt ,i s
ρ
ρ+δη. As an illustration,
suppose that the rate of time preference is ρ =0 .01, the depreciation rate is δ =0 .08,
and the capital share is η =0 .33. In this case, taxable capital income is 3.67%
of total income. In the next subsection, I will show that along a balanced growth
path with a positive growth rate, the share of taxable capital income, Xt
Yt ,c a nb e
substantially higher.
6 . 3 B a l a n c e dG r o w t hP a t h
In this subsection, I consider balanced growth paths along which the capital stock,
consumption, and eﬀective hours of work all grow at the same constant gross rate
γ ≥ 1, which is the exogenous growth rate of the index of labor-augmenting technical






At = γ. In order for the economy to
18be able to attain such a balanced growth path, I assume that the utility function
u(Ct,l t) has a constant elasticity with respect to Ct and is multiplicatively separable







where α>0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, v() > 0,
v0 () has the same sign as 1 − α,a n dv00 () has the opposite sign of 1 − α.I a s s u m e
that βγ1−α < 1, so that along a balanced growth path the present value of the stream
of current and future utility in equation (9) is ﬁnite.
Using the utility function in equation (35), along with τL
t =0and τK
t = τK for














t v(1 − Ht)
¸









t v(1 − Ht)
¸
Rt+1 =1 . (38)
Along a balanced growth path, At, Kt and Ct all grow at gross rate γ, while
hours per worker, Ht, the marginal products FL (Kt,A tHt) and FK (Kt,A tHt),a n d




Substituting equation (39) into equation (25) yields taxable capital income as a func-
19Xt
Yt = Share of Taxable Capital Income
Gross growth rate, γ
1.00 1.01 1.02
Inverse 2 0.037 0.061 0.078
of 3 0.037 0.084 0.113
Intertemporal 4 0.037 0.103 0.140
Elasticity of 5 0.037 0.120 0.161
Substitution, 8 0.037 0.159 0.205
α 10 0.037 0.178 0.224
capital income share: η =0 .33
rate of time preference: ρ =0 .01
depreciation rate: δ =0 .08
T a b l e1 :T a x a b l eC a p i t a lI n c o m ea saS h a r eo fT o t a lI n c o m e







Kt > 0,( 4 0 )
where the inequality on the right hand side follows from the assumption that βγ1−α <
1. Substituting equation (39) into equation (27) shows taxable capital income as a







Multiplying taxable capital income in equation (41) by the tax rate τK yields capital









Note that when γ =1 , so that the balanced growth path is a steady state, equation
(42) becomes identical to equation (34).
Table 1 shows the share of taxable capital income, Xt,i nt o t a li n c o m e ,Yt,f o r
20various values of α, the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and γ,
the exogenous growth rate of At. The calculations in this table are based on a capital
income share η =0 .33, a rate of time preference ρ =0 .01, and a depreciation rate
δ =0 .08.T h e ﬁrst column of results in Table 1 shows that in a steady state, i.e., with
γ =1 , taxable capital income is 3.7% of total income, as shown in subsection 6.2,
regardless of the value of α. Table 1 shows that with modest growth and a modest
value of α, the share of taxable capital income in total income can be substantially
higher. For instance, with growth of one percent per year, i.e., γ =1 .01,a n dα =5 ,
taxable capital income is 12.0% of total income, which is more than triple the value
in the absence of growth. With growth of two percent per year and α =5 ,t a x a b l e
capital income is 16.1% of total income.
7E ﬀective Tax Rate on Capital
The taxation of capital income in actual tax codes generally depends on an array of
tax parameters including the tax rate on taxable capital income, the speciﬁcation of
depreciation allowances used to compute taxable capital income, and possibly also
an investment tax credit rate and the extent to which ﬁnancing costs are deductible.
T h ec o n c e p to ft h eeﬀective tax rate on capital provides a scalar measure of the degree
to which all of the relevant aspects of the tax code together aﬀect a ﬁrm’s optimal
capital stock. In this section, I derive the eﬀective tax rate on capital in the special
case in which there is no investment tax credit and in which ﬁnancing costs are not
deductible by purchasers of capital. I will then use the eﬀective tax rate on capital in
this case to show the relationship between the results of this paper and the ﬁndings
of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985).
As a prelude to calculating the eﬀective tax rate on capital, I will brieﬂyr e v i e w
the calculation of the present value of depreciation deductions, z,i n t r o d u c e db yH a l l
21and Jorgenson (1967). Consider a unit of capital that is purchased in period t for
ap r i c eo f$ 1 ,a n dl e tD(a) ≥ 0 be the depreciation allowance in period t + a when
the unit of capital has age a ≥ 0.I f n o m i n a l c a s h ﬂows are discounted at rate i,
then z =
P∞
a=0 (1 + i)
−a D(a).I f
P∞
a=0 D(a)=1and i>0,t h e nz ≤ 1,w i t hs t r i c t
inequality if D(0) < 1. With immediate expensing, D(0) = 1 and D(a)=0 ,f o r
a =1 ,2,3...,s oz =1 .
Consider a ﬁrm that pays a capital income tax at constant rate τK on taxable
income, which is calculated as gross capital income minus a speciﬁed depreciation
allowance. Let Mt be the present value of the stream of pre-tax marginal products of
capital accruing to the undepreciated portion of a unit of capital purchased in period
t. Suppose that Mt is a decreasing function of (1 − δ)Kt + It = Kt+1.L e t χt be
the price of acquiring a unit of capital in period t,a n dl e tzχt b et h ep r e s e n tv a l u e
of depreciation deductions over the life of the capital good. The optimal value of









χt,( 4 3 )
where the left hand side of equation (43) is the present value of the stream of after-tax
marginal products of capital accruing to the undepreciated portion of a unit of capital
acquired in period t, and the right hand side of equation (43) is the cost of acquiring
a unit of capital in period t, net of the present value of the depreciation tax shield
associated with capital.
The eﬀective tax rate on capital, b τ, is the value of the tax rate on gross capital
income, i.e., capital income without deducting any allowance for depreciation, from
period t onward such that the optimal capital stock is the same as implied by equation
22(43). Therefore, the eﬀective tax rate satisﬁes
(1 − b τ) c Mt = b χt, (44)
where c Mt is the present value of the stream of pre-tax marginal products of capital
accruing to the undepreciated portion of a unit of capital purchased in period t,a n d
b χt is the marginal cost of investment in period t when gross capital income is taxed at
rate b τ.T h e v a l u e o f b τ is chosen so that the path of the capital stock under the gross
capital income tax at rate b τ is identical to the path of the capital stock associated
with equation (43) when capital income, net of depreciation allowances, is taxed at
rate τK.S i n c e t h e ﬁnancing cost is not deductible in either case, the discount rate
is the same in both cases, so c Mt = Mt and b χ = χt. Therefore, dividing each side of
equation (44) by the corresponding side of equation (43) yields




Equation (45) can be rearranged to obtain the following expression for the eﬀective






In the prescription for optimal tax policy that I have described in this paper,
as well as in the Chamley-Judd prescription for the long run, the eﬀective tax rate
on capital is zero. However, my prescription and the Chamley-Judd prescription
obtain zero eﬀective tax rates in diﬀerent ways that have fundamentally diﬀerent
implications for the amount of revenue collected by the optimal capital income tax.
The Chamley-Judd prescription sets τK equal to zero, which according to equation
(46), achieves a zero eﬀective tax rate on capital. However, with τK =0 ,t h ec a p i t a l
income tax does not collect any revenue, so it becomes necessary to use distortionary
23labor income taxation to collect revenue. My prescription for the optimal taxation
of capital income, which includes immediate expensing, implies z =1 .E q u a t i o n
(46) shows that with z =1the eﬀective tax rate on capital is zero for any non-
negative tax rate τK less than 1. Thus, unlike the Chamley-Judd prescription, my
prescription attains a zero eﬀective tax rate on capital, while retaining the ability to
collect revenue using the capital income tax, by setting τK greater than zero. As I
have shown in Section 6, a substantial amount of capital income tax revenue can be
collected with this prescription. If the capital income tax can collect enough revenue
to pay for government purchases, there is no need to use distortionary labor income
taxation.
8 Consumption Goods Tax with a Labor Subsidy
In this section, I illustrate an alternative tax system that can achieve the same allo-
cation of consumption, leisure, and capital that can be achieved by lump-sum taxes.
This alternative system combines a tax on consumption goods, levied at a constant
rate over time, with a subsidy to labor. A consumption goods tax levied at a con-
stant rate over time does not distort intertemporal margins, so it would not distort
capital accumulation. If labor supply were perfectly inelastic, i.e., if leisure were not
in the utility function, a constant tax rate on consumption goods would not aﬀect
the equilibrium allocation. However, when utility depends on leisure, a tax on the
consumption good reduces the price of leisure relative to the taxed consumption good
and thus eﬀectively subsidizes leisure. To counteract this eﬀect, leisure must also be
taxed, which eﬀectively subsidizes labor, to replicate the allocation with lump-sum
taxes.
To examine the eﬀects of a tax on the consumption good combined with a labor
subsidy, I modify the model presented in Sections 1 - 3 by eliminating the capital
24income tax and replacing it with a tax on consumption. Speciﬁcally, letting τC
t > −1
be the tax rate on the consumption good in period t,6 total tax revenue in period t is
Tt = τ
L
t wtAtHt + τ
C
t Ct.( 4 7 )
With the capital income tax replaced by a tax on the consumption good, the budget












wtAtHt + rtKt + RtBt, (48)



















Ct − Kt+1 +( 1− δ)Kt − Bt+1 + RtBt
ª
.
Diﬀerentiating the lagrangian with respect to Ct, Ht, Kt+1,a n dBt+1, setting the
derivatives equal to zero, and then reducing the system of four ﬁrst-order conditions
to a system of three equations by eliminating λt and using the expressions for the
wage rate and the rental rate in equations (2) and (3) yields





At (FL(Kt,A tHt))uC (Ct,1 − Ht) (50)
(Kt+1): β
uC (Ct+1,1 − Ht+1)





[FK (Kt+1,A t+1Ht+1)+1− δ]=1 (51)
6The tax rate on the consumption good can be larger than 100%, but (to keep the subsidized
price of the consumption good positive) any subsidy to the consumption good must be smaller than
100%.
25(Bt+1): β
uC (Ct+1,1 − Ht+1)





Rt+1 =1 . (52)





(51) and (52) equals one, so these equations are identical to equations (20) and (21),
respectively, for an economy with lump-sum taxation. However, a tax on the con-
sumption good alone will not fully reproduce the allocation in an economy with
lump-sum taxes because the tax on the consumption good distorts the labor-leisure
choice, as is evident in equation (50). If labor income is subsidized to the same extent
that consumption is taxed, speciﬁcally, if τL
t = −τC





tion (50) equals one, and this equation is identical to equation (19) for the economy
with lump-sum taxes. Therefore, the allocation that would prevail under lump-sum
taxes can be achieved by taxing the consumption good at a constant rate τC while
subsidizing labor with a negative labor income tax rate τL = −τC.
To calculate the amount of tax revenue that can be collected with τL = −τC,
substitute Yt − It − Gt for Ct (since the economy is a closed economy) in equation
(47), and use τL = −τC to obtain
Tt = τ
C (Yt − It − Gt − wtAtHt). (53)
Use the facts that Yt = KtFK (Kt,A tHt)+AtHtFL(Kt,A tHt) and wt = FL (Kt,A tHt),
to rewrite equation (53) as
Tt = τ
C [KtFK (Kt,A tHt) − It − Gt]. (54)
Use the expression for taxable capital income with immediate expensing, Xt,i ne q u a -
26tion (24) to rewrite equation (54) as
Tt = τ
C (Xt − Gt). (55)
Henceforth, I will conﬁne attention to cases in which τC > 0 and the tax revenue
in equation (55) is positive, so I assume that Gt <X t. Thus, as shown formally in
equation (56) below, to collect a given amount of tax revenue in any period in which
Gt > 0, τC would be higher than the capital income tax rate τK t h a tw o u l dl e a dt o
the same optimal allocation, even though (as in the United States), consumption can
be far larger than capital income net of investment expenditure. The reason that
τC exceeds τK is that in order for the consumption tax system to be optimal it must
include a subsidy to labor income, which essentially gives back much of the revenue
collected by the tax on the consumption good.
To derive the relation between the value of τC in an optimal consumption tax
system and the value of τK in an optimal capital income tax system that would collect
the same amount of revenue, I will now focus on balanced growth paths for which Gt
and Bt both grow at the gross rate γ,w h i c hi st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fAt, Kt, Ct,a n d
Yt. I have shown that the optimal allocation can be attained either by taxing capital
income, with immediate expensing, at rate τK or by taxing the consumption good
at rate τC and subsidizing labor income at rate τC.E q u a t i n gτKXt, the tax revenue
collected by the capital income tax and τC (Xt − Gt), the tax revenue collected by








Thus, as discussed above, if Gt > 0, the consumption tax rate τC must exceed the
capital income tax rate τK that collects the same total revenue.
27In order for the amount of government bonds to grow at rate γ, the amount of
tax revenue, Tt, collected in period t must satisfy
Tt = Gt + RtBt − Bt+1 = Gt +( R − γ)Bt, (57)
where the second equality follows from the fact that γt+1 and Rt+1 are constant along
balanced growth paths. Under the capital income tax with immediate expensing,
t h ea m o u n to ft a xr e v e n u e ,τKXt, must equal the right hand side of equation (57),
which implies that
Gt = τ
KXt − (R − γ)Bt. (58)




1 − τK +( R − γ) Bt
Xt
. (59)





1 − τK. (60)
Equation (60) indicates that the amount by which τC exceeds τK can be substantial.
For instance, if τK =5 0 % , then an optimal consumption tax system would have to
set τC =1 0 0 %to collect the same amount of revenue.
The tax rate τC is levied directly on the consumption good, represented by Ct.
However, the consumption bundle in period t consists of both leisure and the con-
sumption good, so a true consumption tax would tax leisure at rate τC as well.
Taxing leisure at rate τC is the same as subsidizing labor income at rate τC.I n
the absence of any tax (positive or negative) on labor income, a household can in-
crease its consumption of leisure in period t by reducing its labor by one hour and
28foregoing the hourly wage Atwt. However, if labor income is subsidized at rate τC,
so that the after-tax hourly wage is
¡
1+τC¢




wtAt. Thus, a subsidy to labor income at rate τC is a tax on leisure at
rate τC.
I have shown that a constant tax rate on the entire consumption bundle, which
can be implemented by a constant tax rate on the consumption good together with
a constant subsidy to labor income at the same rate, is equivalent to the optimal
capital income tax with immediate expensing. It is important to note, however,
that some tax proposals that purport to be consumption taxes are actually taxes on
consumption goods that fail to tax leisure. For instance, the Hall-Rabushka (1995)
proposal for a “ﬂat tax” is described by its originators as a consumption tax. Hall
and Rabushka proposed to implement their consumption goods tax by taxing both
capital income and labor income. They deﬁne taxable capital income to be the same
as I have discussed in this paper. That is, they propose immediate expensing of
capital expenditures. However, their proposed tax system also levies a tax on labor,
and thus is distortionary if leisure enters the utility function in a nontrivial way.
To summarize, if the optimal tax system is to be implemented by taxing income,
then taxable capital income should be calculated with immediate expensing and labor
income should not be taxed at all. Hall and Rabushka specify taxation of capital in-
come that includes immediate expensing, but their proposed taxation of labor income
is distortionary. Alternatively, if the optimal tax system is to be implemented as a
consumption tax, it must tax the entire consumption bundle by taxing the consump-
tion good and taxing leisure by subsidizing labor income. Hall and Rabushka propose
to tax only the consumption good, and thus their proposed system is distortionary.
299 Concluding Remarks
A classic problem in public ﬁnance is to determine how the government can collect
revenue in the least distortionary way possible, given that lump-sum taxes are not
available. In a general equilibrium Ramsey framework with inﬁnitely-lived house-
holds, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that in the long run it is optimal
for the tax rate on capital to be zero. In their analyses, the government would
collect tax revenue in the long run by taxing labor income. In this paper, I have
re-examined the conditions, previously derived without general equilibrium consider-
ations, under which the tax rate on capital income does not aﬀect the optimal capital
stock of a ﬁrm. The possibility that a capital income tax can be levied in a way
that does not aﬀect the capital investment decision is tantalizing because it may pro-
vide the government with a non-distortionary means to collect revenue. To examine
this possibility, I addressed two questions. First, does the invariance of the capital
investment choice to the tax rate on capital income, under appropriate assumptions
about the deductibility of capital expenditures, carry over to a general equilibrium
framework? Second, if the answer to the ﬁrst question is aﬃrmative, can a capital
income tax that is non-distortionary collect a substantial amount of revenue?
In response to the ﬁrst question, I have shown that if purchasers of capital are
permitted to immediately expense capital expenditures, then in a Ramsey framework
with a representative inﬁnitely-lived household, the accumulation of capital is invari-
ant to a tax rate on capital income that is constant over time. That is, a constant
capital income tax rate with immediate expensing is a non-distortionary tax in general
equilibrium, as well as in the context of a single ﬁrm that cannot deduct its ﬁnancing
costs. For ﬁrms that can deduct ﬁnancing costs, the situation is diﬀerent. For such
ﬁrms, economic depreciation leads to the invariance of capital accumulation to the
tax rate on capital in the context of a single ﬁrm; however, as shown in the Appendix,
30this invariance does not carry over to general equilibrium because the after-tax cost
of ﬁnancing—not the pre-tax cost of ﬁnancing—is invariant to the tax rate in general
equilibrium. Thus, I focused the body of the paper on the case without deductibility
of ﬁnancing costs (as for an all-equity ﬁrm in the United States) and with immediate
expensing so that the capital income tax is non-distortionary.
Since the answer to the ﬁrst question is aﬃrmative with immediate expensing, I
then addressed the second question for the case of immediate expensing. Taxable
capital income with immediate expensing is equal to capital income (revenue less
wages) minus investment expenditures. Abel, Mankiw, Summers, and Zeckhauser
(1989) have shown that in a dynamically eﬃcient economy, capital income is larger
than investment, which implies that, even with immediate expensing, there is a posi-
tive amount of capital income to be taxed. Since capital accumulation is unaﬀected
by the level of the constant tax rate on capital income, provided there is immediate
expensing, there is no “Laﬀer curve” for the capital income tax rate. That is, the
amount of tax revenue collected from the capital income tax is proportional to the
tax rate. The amount of revenue that can be collected is arbitrarily close to the
amount of taxable capital income in the economy. I derive expressions for the share
of taxable capital income in total income, both in a steady state and along a balanced
growth both. Illustrative calculations suggest that this amount could be substantial.
If one looks at U.S. data to judge the size of taxable capital income with immediate
expensing, one could start with gross capital income of about 1/3 of GDP and capital
investment expenditures of about 1/6 of GDP, so that taxable capital income is about
1/6 of GDP. Over the ten-year period ending in 2005, Federal government purchases
of goods and services were about 6.5% of GDP—an amount that could be ﬁnanced by
a capital income tax rate of 39%. While some may regard this value of the capital
i n c o m et a xr a t ea ss o m e w h a th i g h ,i ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tt h el a b o ri n c o m et a x
31rate would be zero and that capital expenditures would be immediately expensed.
32Appendix
Economic Depreciation with Deductibility of Financing Costs
Hall and Jorgenson (1971) have shown, and the results of Samuelson (1964) imply,
that in the context of a single ﬁrm that takes its pre-tax cost of ﬁnancing as ﬁxed
and can deduct its cost of ﬁnancing, the tax rate on capital income does not aﬀect
optimal capital accumulation if the ﬁrm is allowed to deduct economic depreciation
from gross capital income when it computes taxable capital income. Thus, it might
seem that economic depreciation and deductibility of ﬁnancing costs provides another
opportunity for non-distortionary taxation of capital income. However, unlike in the
case of immediate expensing without deductibility of ﬁnancing costs, the neutrality
result for a single ﬁrm does not carry over to a general equilibrium framework. To
illustrate why this neutrality result does not carry over to general equilibrium, I
begin by illustrating the neutrality result for a single ﬁrm that takes the pre-tax cost
of ﬁnancing as ﬁxed.
Consider an inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrm with revenue, net of wages, f (kt) in period t,
where kt is the capital stock used by the ﬁrm in period t. Suppose that capital
depreciates at rate δ per period, so that kt+1−(1 − δ)kt is gross investment in period
t. Suppose that the tax rate on capital income in period t is τK
t and that the ﬁrm
is allowed to deduct economic depreciation from net revenue in computing taxable
capital income. The pre-tax cost of ﬁnancing is θ per period, and suppose that the
























t δkt − (kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt)
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, (A.1)






f (kt), the value of the tax saving due to the depreciation
deduction τK
t δkt, and the cost of gross investment (kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt) in period t.
Diﬀerentiating the right hand side of equation (A.1) with respect to kt+1 and setting

































0 (kt+1) − δ − θ]=0 . (A.3)
Equation (A.3) illustrates the invariance of the ﬁrm’s optimal capital stock with
respect to the capital income tax rate. For any value the capital income tax rate,
τK
t ,s u c ht h a t0 ≤ τK
t < 1, the optimal capital stock satisﬁes f0 (kt)=δ + θ.T h i s
invariance depends importantly on the fact that the pre-tax cost of ﬁnancing, θ,i s
invariant to the tax rate τK
t . However, in general equilibrium, the pre-tax cost of
ﬁnancing will not remain invariant to τK
t , as I will now show.
Consider the general equilibrium model introduced in Sections 1 - 3, but change
the tax treatment of capital income. Speciﬁcally, suppose that instead of immediate
expensing, the owners of capital are allowed to deduct an amount equal to economic
depreciation δKt. I will write the depreciation deduction in period t as DtKt to
include also the alternative depreciation allowance schedule that I introduce at the
end of this Appendix. With this speciﬁcation of the tax treatment of capital income,



























Diﬀerentiating the lagrangian with respect to Ct, Ht, Kt+1,a n dBt+1, setting the
derivatives equal to zero, and then reducing the system of four equations to a system
of three equations by eliminating λt yields






wtAtuC (Ct,1 − Ht) (A.5)
(Kt+1): β
uC (Ct+1,1 − Ht+1)













uC (Ct+1,1 − Ht+1)
uC (Ct,1 − Ht)
Rt+1 =1 . (A.7)
If the allocation Ct, Ht,a n dKt+1,t=0 ,1,2,..., is to be invariant to the tax rate
on capital income, then the left hand side of equation (A.7) indicates that Rt+1 must
be invariant to the tax rate on capital income. The gross rate of return Rt+1 is an
after-tax gross rate of return. The invariance of economic depreciation in the context
of a single ﬁrm is predicated on the invariance of the pre-tax cost of ﬁnancing to the
tax rate on capital income, so that the after-tax cost of ﬁnancing is a decreasing
function of the tax rate. Because the after-tax cost of ﬁnancing is invariant to the
tax rate in general equilibrium, economic depreciation does not lead to neutrality
with respect to the tax rate on capital income, as I will show below.








t+1Dt+1 +1− δ = Rt+1. (A.8)
In the case of economic depreciation, Dt = δ,s oe q u a t i o n( A . 8 )c a nb er e w r i t t e na s





If the allocation Ct, Ht,a n dKt+1,t=0 ,1,2,...,i st ob ei n v a r i a n tt ot h et a x
rate on capital income, then the left hand side of equation (A.9) must be invariant
to the tax rate on capital income, and, as discussed above, Rt+1 must be invariant
to the tax rate on capital income. However, unless Rt+1 =1 , the right hand side of
equation (A.9) depends on τK
t+1, which would be inconsistent with the left hand side
being invariant to τK
t+1. Therefore, economic depreciation will not, in general, make
the capital income tax a non-distortionary tax in general equilibrium.7
Economic depreciation does not make capital accumulation invariant to the tax
rate on capital income in general equilibrium because the after-tax cost of ﬁnancing
is invariant to the tax rate. In the context of a single ﬁrm, when the after-tax cost
of ﬁnancing is invariant to the tax rate on capital income, neutrality of the tax rate
requires that the present value of depreciation allowances, z, must equal one. I will
show that it is possible to augment economic depreciation to achieve z =1 ,a n dt h u s
to achieve neutrality; however, under this alternative neutral tax scheme, taxable
capital income is identically zero.
Suppose that the depreciation factor, Dt,t h a ti si n t r o d u c e di ne q u a t i o n( A . 4 )i s
7If it were to turn out that Rt+1 =1 , then equation (A.9) implies that taxable capital income,
FK (Kt+1,A t+1Ht+1)Kt+1 −δKt+1, would be zero. Therefore, even if it turned out that Rt+1 =1 ,
so that economic depreciation would lead to tax rate neutrality, the capital income tax would not
be able to collect any revenue.
36speciﬁed to be
Dt = Rt − 1+δ, (A.10)
where Rt is the after-tax gross rate of return on bonds in equation (A.7). A unit of
capital purchased in period t increases the capital stock in period t+j, j =1 ,2,3,...,
by (1 − δ)
j−1 units, so the present value of depreciation deductions accruing to a unit









j−1 Dt+j.I t c a n
b es h o w nt h a tw i t ht h es p e c i ﬁcation of depreciation allowances in equation (A.10),
zt =1 .8 To see that the depreciation allowance speciﬁed in equation (A.10) is neutral,














FK (Kt+1,A t+1Ht+1)+1− δ = Rt+1 (A.12)
regardless of the value of τK
t+1. The amount of taxable income, with the depreciation
allowance speciﬁcation in equation (A.10) is
FK (Kt,A tHt)Kt − DtKt =[ FK (Kt,A tHt) − (Rt − 1+δ)]Kt =0 , (A.13)
where the second equality follows from equation (A.12). Thus, the neutral tax scheme





















.L e t x0 =
1 and xt+j ≡ 1−δ






(1 − xt+j). Applying the
Lemma in footnote 5 yields zt =1 .
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